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Institutions determine prospects for economic growth and develop-
ment. This paper collapses potentially complex interactions of di®erent
institutions into a simple condition on the primitives that determines
whether a society supports spot markets or not. In a dynamic model of
an agrarian economy agents are heterogeneous in land holdings, skill, and
food endowments. Food holdings serve as a proxy for agents' power to
expropriate. The main point of interest is whether land is assigned to the
skilled or to the powerful, i.e. by coalitional expropriation or by markets.
The model ¯nds two di®erent types of limit behavior: a sequence of sta-
ble markets and a limit cycle where markets and expropriation alternate.
More equal ¯rst period endowment distributions facilitate sustainable
markets that, in turn, enhance economic e±ciency and decrease macroe-
conomic °uctuations.
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The quality of institutions interferes with the ability of markets to successfully
assign scarce goods to individuals who can put them to their most productive
use. Hence, institutions determine prospects for economic growth and devel-
opment, as has been noted by North (1991) and a corresponding literature.
Indeed, there appears to be some empirical support for this hypothesis, see
e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Engerman and Sokolo® (2002). Most of the
existing literature on institutions and growth has emphasized on explicitly
modeling particular institutions, such as elections, specialists for violence, or
contract enforcement. We depart from this approach by collapsing potentially
complex interactions of di®erent institutions into a simple stability condition
on the primitives that re°ects whether a society supports market allocations
or not. That is we focus on stability of outcomes rather than modeling spe-
ci¯c institutions. This has the virtue that the precise nature of interactions
between di®erent institutions of political, social, legal or economic nature has
not to be incorporated into the model. Indeed, it is not obvious which is
the correct set of institutions to be used in a model since di®erent types of
institution may reinforce or cancel each other's e®ect on the economic alloca-
tion. Enforcement of property rights, for instance, has been observed under a
variety of political institutions (relative stability of property rights under the
dictatorships in South Korea and Chile are cases in point). Looking across
countries and over the years 1960-90, Mulligan et al. (2004) do not observe
any systematic economic or social policy di®erences between democracies and
(non-communist) non-democracies.
To address these issues we propose a simple dynamical model of an agricul-
tural economy. Agents are heterogeneous in land holdings, food endowments,
and skill. Food holdings serve as a proxy for agents' power to expropriate other
{ weaker { agents. The underlying economic problem consists in whether land
is assigned to the skilled or to the powerful. The set of economic outcomes
of this assignment problem contains the competitive equilibrium allocation of
the market for land, and all conceivable redistributions of land to coalitions of
agents, termed coalitional expropriation. To determine the economic outcome
a stability property is used: an allocation is said to be stable if there is no
other allocation that is strictly preferred by su±ciently powerful agents.
It turns out that among all coalitional expropriations the only one that may
be stable assigns the land to the most powerful agents in the economy. This
2assignment mechanism coincides with versions of some allocations known in
the literature, e.g. the jungle equilibrium in Piccione and Rubinstein (2006),
the pillage game equilibrium (Jordan, 2006), or the dog bone economy in
Sattinger (1993). Moreover, stability of competitive markets in a given period
is favored by more equal food endowment distributions and by less mismatch
between demand and supply on the market.
In the dynamic setting two distinct pattern of economic growth may emerge.
On the one hand, there may emerge sustainable markets, that is, after ¯nite
time spot markets for land will be stable in every period. On the other hand,
after ¯nite time there may emerge a limit cycle where markets will be unstable
in one period but stable in every other. Limit cycles permit both persistent
elites and social mobility depending on the distribution of surplus on the
market. A more equal endowment distribution of food in the initial period
increases the strength of market supporters and facilitates stability of markets
that in turn lead to higher output and a less volatile growth path. The model
is consistent with the emergence of the landed gentry as described by Rajan
and Zingales (2003), and the dependence on initial distributions of power re-
sembles the ¯ndings of Engerman and Sokolo® (2005). The main ideas of the
model are illustrated using historical examples from Malaysia, South Korea
and Philippines (re°ecting the example provided by B¶ enabou (1996)).
This paper is related to the ¯eld of institutional development. In this lit-
erature institutions are understood typically as the degree of property rights
enforcement in conjunction with speci¯c political institutions from a limited
feasible set.1 In contrast to those works our paper abstracts from modeling
any speci¯c institution and exclusively relies on stability of economic alloca-
tions. More recently it has been emphasized, for instance by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) and Rajan and Zingales (2006), that institutions determin-
ing the economic allocation are not equivalent to political institutions. They
focus rather on the persistence of powerful elites governing the economic al-
location in order to seize economic rents. Though our model can encompass
persistent elites, its focus is quite another: we study the prerequisites for the
development of competitive spot markets.
The paper is connected to a second ¯eld of literature, on stability of prop-
erty rights in the presence of rent seeking.2 This literature tends to emphasize
1Some contributions following this approach are for instance Acemoglu (2006); Acemoglu
et al. (2004); Besley and Persson (2007); Cervellati et al. (2005); Gradstein (2004, 2006).
2See for instance Grossman (1991, 2001, 2004); Hafer (2006); Konrad and Skaperdas
3e±ciency losses, due to resource destruction or time dedicated to prepare and
¯ght a con°ict, that arises when property rights cannot be enforced. We use
a di®erent modeling strategy, in which contracts are enforceable when the
subsequent allocation is supported by su±ciently powerful agents versus al-
ternative feasible allocations. This stresses allocative distortions generated by
an imperfect match between skill and land.
Finally, this work is linked to a panoply of papers that studies the rela-
tionship between inequality and growth, in particular to those focusing on an
institutional channel.3 They argue that inequality a®ects the choice of par-
ticular political institutions. These in turn determine economic e±ciency and
thus prospects for growth. In our model low inequality in initial food endow-
ments directly facilitates the emergence of stable spot markets. This means
land is allocated e±ciently among agents and, as a result, output and average
growth rate are higher. Interestingly, our model identi¯es also an institutional
channel that may explain high macro economic volatility of underdeveloped
countries. Under some parametric conditions, the model predicts the existence
of an institutional cycle where markets and expropriation alternate. Periods of
low growth under expropriation are followed by periods of accelerated growth
when markets take place and the previous e±ciency losses are partially recov-
ered.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model framework,
section 3 contains the analysis of the static equilibrium. In sections 4 and 5
we present our main results, while section 6 provides a case study in which we
compare institutions and economic performance of Korea, Malaysia and the
Philippines. Section 7 concludes.
2 Framework
2.1 Agents
In each period t the economy is populated by a continuum of agents I en-
dowed with unit Lebesgue measure. Agents live for one period only. An agent
i 2 I is fully characterized by their type, that is their productivity µi, their
holdings of land ¸i, and their holdings of food !i. Initial period land and food
(1999); Muthoo (2004); Tornell (1993).
3See Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Grossman (1994); Persson and Tabellini (1994); Alesina
and Perotti (1996) among others.
4holdings are distributed independently. Agent i can be skilled, µi = µH, or
unskilled, µi = µL < µH. In each period a time invariant measure s of agents
are drawn randomly according to a uniform distribution and become skilled.
The remainder remains unskilled. The skill distribution in period t is thus
exogenous and denoted by (µi;t)i2I. Agent i may hold land, ¸i = 1, or not,
¸i = 0. The endowment of land in the economy is time invariant and given by
l 6= s. Denote the endogenous land distribution in period t by (¸i;t)i2I. The
joint distribution of food and land in period t is denoted by Ft(!;¸), the initial
period marginal distribution function with respect to food is assumed to be
di®erentiable. Lower and upper bounds of the support of the food distribution
in period t are denoted by !t and !t. Food endowments serve as a proxy for
agents' strengths: well-fed agents are more powerful than poorly fed agents
and capable of evicting them from their land. An agent's utility is linear in
the consumption good at the end of a period.
2.2 Production
Agents work their land producing food output which depends on their skill
and on their food endowments. This gives rise to agents' valuations v(:) for
food and land holdings depending on own skill:
v(µi;¸i;!i) = r!i +
(
µi if ¸i = 1
¾ otherwise.
Note that v(:) also gives agent i' income. An agent cannot work more than
one unit of land. This is best interpreted as a Leontief production technology
or as a constraint on the ability to control ownership of land. Food holdings
are productive and earn a rate of return r > 1. This can be thought of as
a part of the subsistence income that depends on !i, for instance a backyard
activity requiring physical labor. Given the distributions of land and skill are
not perfectly correlated there are gains from trade prior to production: There
exist prices to ensure that (µL;1;:) and (µH;0;:) agents are willing to exchange
land for the consumption good. Hence, agents have an opportunity to trade
before production takes place. Alternatively there exists the possibility to earn
a subsistence income ¾ < µL. For notational convenience, let us normalize
subsistence income to zero, i.e. ¾ = 0.
52.3 Timing
The timing in each period t of the model is the following:
- at stage 0 agents are born and nature draws types,
- at stage 1 land is assigned to agents,
- at stage 2 production and payo®s take place, agents die and bequeath.
This means that there is no role for debt or rental contracts and expropriation
takes place only before production. Allowing the model to have markets and
production twice each period is an immediate extension and left for future
research. Periods are linked by bequests. To make the dynamics of the model
tractable agents are assumed to bequeath a ¯xed percentage b of their income
in the consumption good and their land holdings.4 Let br > 1 to let the
economy outgrow the credit market friction.
2.4 Assignment of Land
The main economic interaction in the model is the allocation of land among
agents. We consider two versions of assignment mechanism, market for spot
contracts and coalitional expropriation. On the market for spot contracts con-
tracts are written that specify an amount of land and an amount of food that
is to be exchanged against each other. An allocation implied by spot markets
is the competitive equilibrium allocation of land and food. On the other hand,
land may be assigned by coalitional expropriation. Any redistribution of the
land endowment among agents can be reached by coalitional expropriation.
Only land can be expropriated, food can be hidden or consumed. We con-
sider the case of costless redistribution of land, so that the allocation of food
reached by coalitional expropriation coincides with food endowments. Feasible
allocations can be summarized as follows.
De¯nition 1 Let (!i;t;¸i;t)i2I be initial endowments of food and land in pe-
riod t. An allocation (!i;¸i)i2I is feasible if
(i)
R
i2I ¸idi = l and ¸i 2 f0;1g for all i 2 I (feasibility of the land alloca-
tion) and
4This is consistent with a standard 'warm glow' bequest motive used in the literature.
6(ii) (!i;¸i)i2I is either a competitive equilibrium of the market for land and
food, i.e. is induced by a market for spot contracts, or (!i)i2I = (!i;t)i2I,
i.e. is induced by coalitional expropriation.
De¯nition 1 contains two important assumptions. First, redistribution does
not waste resources. Second, only deterministic redistribution is considered.
We want to focus on distortions of the economic allocation as a consequence of
expropriation rather than on the waste of resources. When admitting stochas-
tic redistribution the question of enforcing the outcome arises.5 The focus of
this paper is on identifying allocations induced by assignment mechanisms that
are stable with respect to coalitional deviations to other feasible allocations.
De¯ne stability as the following binary relation.





i2C0 !idi where C = fi 2 I : v(µi;¸i;!i) > v(µi;¸0
i;!0
i)g and
C0 = fi 2 I : v(µi;¸i;!i) < v(µi;¸0
i;!0
i)g. An allocation is stable if it is stable
with respect to any other feasible allocation.
Intuitively, a stable allocation must be supported by su±ciently powerful
agents versus any alternative allocation. For instance, a spot market allo-
cation is considered stable only if for any alternative feasible allocation agents
strictly preferring the market outcome are more powerful than agents strictly
preferring the alternative. Strict preference is required since agents attacking
or defending the status quo allocation may need to communicate and coor-
dinate.6 Note that the relation \stable with respect to" does not need to be
transitive.
De¯nition 3 An equilibrium in period t > 0 is a feasible allocation (¸¤
t;!¤
t)
that is stable with respect to any other stable allocation.
Trivially, an equilibrium allocation in period t then always exists. A stable
allocation may not exist, however, so that multiple allocations may be consis-
tent with equilibrium. In case of multiple equilibria we select an equilibrium
allocation (¸¤
t;!¤
t) that is implied by the assignment mechanism that implied
the equilibrium allocation in period t ¡ 1. For convenience we set the assign-
ment mechanism to coalitional expropriation by the most powerful coalition
5However, when credit market frictions are su±ciently severe stochastic expropriation
may lead to higher output than assignment by markets. Gall (2007) pursues this point.
6This means introducing a strictly positive coordination cost that is su±ciently small
does not alter the results.
7in period t = ¡1.7 Hence, a static equilibrium allocation is the allocation
implied by the status quo assignment mechanism unless there exists another
allocation that is stable with respect to all other allocations.
3 Static Equilibrium
Before determining properties of the static equilibrium it is useful to charac-
terize the price of land on a market for spot contracts.
3.1 Market for Contracts
Markets for spot contracts induce a competitive equilibrium allocation that
equates supply and demand for land given by valuations v(µi;¸i;!i) subject
to individual liquidity constraints !i;t > pt. Land is assigned to those agents
who value it most, that is the skilled, and have su±cient food endowment to
pay for it, since credit markets are absent from this model.
Proposition 1 (Market for Spot Contracts) The price for land on a mar-














r j¸i=0) · s¡l
s(1¡l)
(1)
If s · l then rpt = µL for all t.
Proof: In Appendix.
Suppose for instance that ! follows U[0;1] and 0 < µL < µH < 1 and !
and ¸ are independent. Then an example for the market allocation is given in
Figure 1 where the market price is µL.
At price pt = µL=r all unskilled agents are indi®erent between holding
land and not doing so, and at price pt = µH=r all skilled agents are indi®erent.
Hence, there has to be some form of rationing. We assume that all agents who
are indi®erent between holding land and not doing so are uniformly rationed.
This seems a reasonable assumption, since otherwise a skilled agent i with
!i;t > pt, who is not assigned land, will ¯nd it pro¯table to o®er a marginally
7Alternatively, assuming an initial period distribution of food with ^ !0 · µL=r su±ces to




































Figure 1: Market for Contracts
higher price and obtain land with certainty. Note that there is no trade if
Ft(µL
r ) = 1 because all agents are too poor to be able to su±ciently compensate
an unskilled agent. Moreover, it follows from (1) that for su±ciently low
measures of skilled agents the market equilibrium has rpt = µL.8
3.2 Coalitional Expropriation: the Jungle Emerges
Characterize the measure l of the most powerful agents by de¯ning a cuto®
food endowment ^ !t as follows.
^ !t : ¹(i 2 I : !i > ^ !) = l;
where ¹(:) denotes the measure of agents. The cuto® value is well-de¯ned
even if Ft(!) has an atom at ^ !t. Let (!E;¸E) denote a feasible allocation
with !E
i = !i;t and ¸E
i = 1 if !i;t ¸ ^ !t and ¸E
i = 1 if !i;t ¸ ^ !t. Then a very
useful result follows immediately.
Proposition 2 (Expropriation) The allocation (!E;¸E) is stable with re-
spect to all feasible allocations (!0;¸0) with !0
i = !i;t. If Ft(!) is atomless
(!E;¸E) is unique a.e. on I.
8If the subsistence income is greater than µL unskilled sellers' reservation value drops to
0 and the above equation holds if µL is replaced by 0. Note further that pt induces a cuto®
level of food endowment such that agents with !i;t > pt obtain land on the market and
agents with !i;t < pt do not.
9Proof: Consider a feasible allocation (!0;¸0) with !0
i = !i;t for all i 2 I. We
have that v(µi;¸E
i ;!E
i ) > v(µi;¸0
i;!0
i) if and only if i 2 C = fi 2 I : ¸0
i =
0 ^ ¸E
i = 1g, and v(µi;¸E
i ;!E
i ) < v(µi;¸0
i;!0
i) if and only if i 2 C0 = fi 2 I :
¸0
i = 1 ^ ¸E







Note that ¹(i 2 I : ¸0
i = 1 ^ ¸i = 0) = ¹(i 2 I : ¸0
i = 0 ^ ¸i = 1), i.e. ¹(i 2
C) = ¹(i 2 C0), as both allocations are feasible. Since ¸E
i = 1 , !i;t ¸ ^ !t
and ¸E
i = 0 , !i;t · ^ !t, !i;t ¸ !j;t for all i 2 C and j 2 C0. This implies (2).
Uniqueness a.e. follows immediately from the de¯nition of ^ !t. ¤
Proposition 2 states that there is a unique distribution of land ¸E implied
by coalitional redistribution and stable with respect to coalitional redistribu-
tion. This allocation is characterized by expropriation of the weak by the
strong, that is the economy becomes a jungle. (!E;¸E) will be referred to
as allocation under expropriation in the remainder of the paper. There are
several reasons for singling out expropriation among a continuum of feasible
coalitional expropriations. First, expropriation does not require coordination.
Second, it coincides with an assignment of land to agents based on power.
Third, it has become a recurrent theme in the literature under various guises.9
Turn now to stability of expropriation with respect to the market allocation.
The stability condition is given by
Z ^ !
!

















in case of a low price rpt = µL, and by
Z ^ !
!











9For instance the jungle equilibrium in Piccione and Rubinstein (2006), the pillage game
equilibrium in (Jordan, 2006), and the dog bone economy in Sattinger (1993).
10for intermediate prices of land µL < rpt < µH.
Su±ciently powerful agents (!i;t > ^ !t) not endowed with land always
strictly prefer expropriation to markets. Identity of market supporters depends
on the equilibrium market price, however. Weak agents (!i;t < ^ !t) holding
land always strictly prefer spot markets, since they are expropriated otherwise.
For low market prices (rpt < µH), skilled agents that do not hold land and
are too weak to expropriate (pt · !i;t < ^ !t) strictly prefer markets. For high
market prices (rpt > µL) strong agents (!i;t > ^ !t) who are unskilled and hold
land support markets in order to be able to sell land. It is straightforward
that intermediate market prices (µL < rpt < µH) do not favor stability of
expropriation, since under these market prices surplus is shared quite equally
in the economy.
3.3 Stability of Markets
We now check for stability of markets with respect to all other allocations.
De¯ne the optimal coalitional expropriation as a distribution of land ¸0 implied
by coalitional expropriation that maximizes the di®erence between the power
of agents strictly preferring ¸0 and the power of agents who strictly prefer
a market. Then stability of markets with respect to the optimal coalitional
expropriation is su±cient for stability of markets with respect to all coalitional
expropriations.
Lemma 1 (Optimal Coalitional Expropriation) There exists an optimal
coalitional expropriation ¸0 characterized by
² ¸0
i = 1 if !i;t > e ! and ¸i;t = 0 or ¸i;t = 1 and µi = µH if rpt = µH,
² ¸0
i = 1 if !i;t > e ! and ¸i;t = 1 or ¸i;t = 0 and µi = µL or if !i;t >
maxfe !=2;minfpt; ^ !tgg and ¸i;t = 0 and µi = µH if rpt = µL,
² ¸0
i = 1 if !i;t > e ! and ¸i;t = 1 and µi = µH, or if !i;t > maxfe !=2;minfpt; ^ !tgg
and ¸i;t = 0 and µi = µH, or if !i;t > e ! and ¸i;t = 0 and µi = µL if
µL < rpt < µH,
with e ! implicitly de¯ned by ¹(i 2 I : ¸i = 1) = l ^ e ! = 0.
Proof: In Appendix.
Designing an optimal coalitional expropriation to attack markets means
deciding on an assignment of land that gives land to agents with the highest
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Figure 2: Optimal Coalitional Expropriation
marginal contribution of power to the deviating coalition. An agent con-
tributes with his power, that is his food endowment, in case of a preference
switch (e.g. from market supporter to indi®erence) when given land. Hence,
agents switching from supporting markets to supporting coalitional expropri-
ation (well-o®, i.e. !i > p, skilled landless agents when rpt < µH) are prime
recipients of land while agents who cannot be prevented from supporting mar-
kets (rich unskilled landholders when rpt < µH) are never given land. This
means the optimal coalitional expropriation to attack markets needs not coin-
cide with expropriation. An example for an optimal coalitional expropriation
for rpt = µL is depicted in Figure 2 where the distribution of land is indicated
by the letters N and L.
Markets are stable if aggregate power of agents strictly preferring a market
to any coalitional expropriation exceeds aggregate power of agents strictly
preferring coalitional expropriation to a market. Aggregate power of each
group is given by agents' aggregate food holdings in each group. Note that
by de¯nition stability with respect to the optimal coalitional expropriation
implies stability with respect to any other feasible allocation resulting from
coalitional expropriation. The stability condition for markets with respect to
12optimal coalitional expropriation is given by
Z e !
!





















in case of a low price rpt = µL, and by
Z e !
!














if the price for land is intermediate µL < rpt < µH.
In case the events holding land ¸i;t = 1 and belonging to the most powerful
agents !i;t > ^ !t are perfectly correlated the market allocation is stable with
respect to any other allocation.
Proposition 3 Let endowments satisfy ¸i;t = 1 if !i;t > ^ !t and ¸i;t = 0 if
!i;t < ^ !t. Then an allocation implied by markets is stable with respect to all
other allocations. If ^ !t · µL=r allocations under markets and expropriation
coincide.
Proof: In Appendix.
That is, for perfect correlation of land and power the market allocation
is always an equilibrium. This is particularly interesting when realizing that
an allocation under expropriation induces perfect correlation in next period's
land and food endowments. Moreover, Proposition 3 states that for poor
economies (^ !t · µL=r) absence of a credit market prevents any trade on the
spot market for land, implying that expropriation and markets yield the same
allocation. Moreover, severity of the allocative distortion caused by credit
market imperfections interferes with the likelihood of stability of markets.
Stability of markets becomes more likely as the measure of agents excluded
from the market ¹(i 2 I : !i;t < pt) decreases, since slackness of conditions
(7) and (8) increases. Additionally, inequality of period t food endowments
13may prevent stability of markets, as stated in the following proposition. This
is because less inequality translates into a reduction of the power of the rich
agents without land and an increase in the power of poor agents holding land.
The e®ect of a change in inequality is less pronounced, however, in a high price
environment because it also decreases the power of unskilled rich landholders
who support markets.
Proposition 4 (i) Let rpt > µL. A redistribution of food from agents with
!i > !0 to agents with !i < !00 < !0 makes stability of markets more likely
if rpt = µL, s su±ciently close to 1, or correlation between food and land is
su±ciently low.
(ii) Let rpt = µL. A redistribution of food from agents with !i > !0 to agents
with !i < !0 makes stability of markets more likely.
Proof: In Appendix.
Finally, we are interested in whether equilibrium allocations satisfy a min-
imum e±ciency requirement, namely constrained Pareto e±ciency.
De¯nition 4 An allocation (¸¤;!¤) is constrained Pareto-e±cient if it is fea-
sible and there does not exist another feasible allocation (¸0;!0) that Pareto-
dominates (¸¤;!¤).
The use of the quali¯er is indeed appropriate since the set of feasible allocation
gives rise to a fundamental non-transferability of utility. The following propo-
sition asserts that equilibrium allocations indeed satisfy constrained Pareto
e±ciency.
Proposition 5 A static equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto-e±cient.
Proof: In Appendix.
Note that aggregate output is maximized by an allocation that assigns
land to the skilled. Thus there exists always an allocation under coalitional
expropriation that is output e±cient. Although markets yield always at least
as much output as expropriation, they are output e±cient only if the economy
has grown su±ciently rich, since otherwise some unskilled are assigned land,
but not all skilled.
144 Transition Functions
Key to the model's long run dynamics is the transition function that maps
period t's joint distribution of land and food into period t + 1's joint distri-
bution of land and food. The transition function is well de¯ned since under
our selection rule an equilibrium allocation entirely determines next period's
endowments through the warm glow bequest motive.
4.1 Allocation under Expropriation
Under expropriation payo®s are either µi if !i;t > ^ !t, or 0 otherwise. Food
endowments in period t + 1 are given by
!i;t+1 = br!i;t + b
(
µi if !i;t ¸ ^ !i;t
0 if !i;t < ^ !i;t:
Since land goes to the powerful, the land distribution in period t + 1 is
¸i;t+1 =
(
1 if !i;t ¸ ^ !i;t
0 if !i;t < ^ !i;t:




This means that, by Proposition 3, an equilibrium with expropriation in pe-
riod t implies that the market allocation is stable with respect to all other
allocations in period t + 1. That is, the strongest agents obtain land in the
jungle in t and thus higher income than expropriated agents. Hence, the strong
agents' o®spring will be among the strongest agents in t + 1 as well. Since
they already hold land, there is no pro¯t in expropriating again. Moreover,
measure 1 ¡ s of the strong agents' o®spring is unskilled in period t + 1 and
may ¯nd it pro¯table to sell their land on a spot market in t + 1.
4.2 Markets for spot contracts when rpt = µL
In period t unskilled agents earn 0 from land when not endowed with land and
µL otherwise. Returns from land for skilled agents are µH ¡µL if they are not
endowed with land and !i;t ¸ µL=r, and µH if they are endowed with land.
Hence, food endowments in period t + 1 are
!i;t+1 = br!i;t + b
(
µi if ¸i;t = 1
µi ¡ µL if ¸i;t = 0:
(9)
15Deriving the land distribution in period t+1 is slightly more involved. Land-
holders either obtain land on the market if !i;t > pt or inherit it. To have
rpt = µL land supply must exceed demand by skilled agents, that is ¹(i : µi;t =
µL;¸i;t = 1) ¸ ¹(i : µi;t = µH;¸i;t = 0;!i ¸ pt). Then the market allocation is
determined by assigning land to all skilled agents with !i;t ¸ pt and uniformly
rationing the excess supply of land among all unskilled agents i with ¸i;t = 1
or !i;t > pt. The probability of such an agent i to be assigned land on the




¹(i 2 I : µi;t = µL;¸i;t = 1) ¡ ¹(i 2 I : µi;t = µH;¸i;t = 0;!i;t ¸ pt)
¹(i 2 I : µi;t = µL;¸i;t = 1 _ !i;t ¸ pt)
=
l ¡ s
1¡s¹(i 2 I : !i;t ¸ pt;¸i;t = 0)
l + ¹(i 2 I : !i;t ¸ pt;¸i;t = 0)
: (10)
That is, ¸i;t+1 is given by
¸i;t+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1 if µi;t = µH;¸i;t = 0 _ !i;t ¸ µL=r
0 if ¸i;t = 0;!i;t < µL=r (
1 with prob. qL
t
0 with prob. 1 ¡ qL
t
if µi;t = µL;¸i;t = 1 _ !i;t ¸ µL=r
(11)
Note that uniform rationing implies independence of endowment and land dis-
tributions among agents with unskilled parents endowed with land or su±cient
food to pay the market price.
4.3 Markets for spot contracts when rp = µH
Payo®s from holding land for unskilled agents are either 0 when not endowed
with land or µH otherwise. Skilled agents earn 0 when not endowed with land
or µH otherwise. That is, food endowments in period t + 1 are
!i;t+1 = br!i;t + b
(
µH if ¸i;t = 1
0 if ¸i;t = 0
(12)
The unskilled sell all their land on the market. The skilled are indi®erent
between holding land or not. To have rpt = µH we need excess demand, that
is ¹(i 2 I : µi;t = µL;¸i;t = 1) · ¹(i : µi;t = µH;¸i;t = 0;!i;t ¸ pt). Under
uniform rationing the probability of a skilled agent with ¸i;t = 1 or !i;t > pt




¹t(i : ¸i;t = 1)
¹t(i : µi = µH;¸i = 1 _ !i ¸ pt)
=
l
s(l + ¹t(i : ¸i;t = 0 ^ !i;t ¸ pt))
: (13)





0 if ¸i;t = 0;!i;t < µH=r or µi;t = µL (
1 with prob. qH
t
0 with prob. 1 ¡ qH
t
if µi;t = µH;¸i;t = 0 _ !i;t ¸ µH=r
(14)
Note at this point that if demand for land exceeds supply in period t, this will
also hold in period t + 1 since agents' endowments are increasing in time as
br > 1 thus reducing the measure of wealth constrained agents. That is, the
price for land does not decrease in time once the there is su±cient demand for
land to sustain the high price in some period.
Lemma 2 Suppose a market for contracts is stable in period t with market
price pt = µH=r. Then pt+1 = pt.
Proof: In Appendix.
5 Long Run Stability of Markets
Observe ¯rst that in the long run the market price for land depends only on
whether the skilled can be satis¯ed with the stock of land. This is because
the absence of credit markets has no impact on the market for land once the
economy has grown su±ciently rich.
Lemma 3 There exists T < 1 such that for all t > T
(i) rpt = µL and qL
t = l¡s
1¡s if l > s, and
(ii) rpt = µH and qH
t = l
s if l < s.
Proof: Start by noting that there exists T < 1 such that !T > µH=r, since
br > 1 and !0 > 0. This implies FT(!=rj¸ = 0) = FT(µL=rj¸ = 0) = 0.
Applying this to (1) yields rpT = µL if l > s and (ii) rpT = µH if l < s. By
(10), qL
T = l¡s
1¡s and by (13) qH
T = l
s. Since !t is strictly increasing in t, this
must hold for t > T as well. ¤
We are interested in the long run behavior of the economy depending on
primitives and the initial distribution of food and land. In the following we
analyze two cases, (i) l > s and (ii) l < s.
175.1 Case l > s
By Lemma 3 the spot market price for land is given by rpt = µL for su±ciently
high t. Since l > s there will be rationing on the spot market, skilled agents
obtain land on the market with probability 1 and unskilled agents obtain land
with probability qL
t . This introduces a convenient independence between next
period's distributions of land and food among descendants of unskilled agents.
Thus, given stability of spot markets in t, the marginal distribution of food


































This expression can be derived using the transition function (9). Using this
intertemporal link between joint distributions we are able to derive bounds on
the initial conditions su±cient and necessary for spot market stability.
Proposition 6 Let l > s.
(i) There exists T < 1 such that markets are stable in every period t =
T + ¿, ¿ = 1;2;::: if
gS
L(E0(!);E0(!j! < ^ !0);l) < 1;
where gS
L is a function gS
L : R3
+ 7! R that increases in E0(!), decreases
in E0(!j! < ^ !0), and increases in l.
(ii) There exists T < 1 such that markets are stable in every period t =
T + 2¿ ¡ 1 and markets are unstable in every other period t = T + 2¿,
¿ = 1;2;::: if
gU
L(E0(!);E0(!j! < ^ !0);l) > 1;
where gU
L is a function gU
L : R3
+ 7! R that increases in E0(!), decreases
in E0(!j! < ^ !0), and increases in l.
Proof: In Appendix.
Proposition 6 states that whenever initial period endowments are su±-
ciently high markets are stable if the initial distribution of food is su±ciently
18equal.10 Conversely, there is a limit cycle if the initial endowment distribution
is su±ciently unequal. This property carries over from the static equilibrium.
Moreover, both the su±cient and the necessary condition tighten in l.
5.2 Case l < s
Again, we can state Ft+1 in terms of Ft. Since l < s, a spot market allocates
all land by uniform rationing to skilled agents thereby implying independence
of next period's land and food endowment distributions. Hence, given stability
of spot markets in period t the joint distribution of food and land endowments















Intuitively, markets assign all land randomly and independently from initial
land and food endowments as the allocation of land depends only skill and
uniform rationing.
Proposition 7 Let l < s.
(i) There exists T < 1 such that markets are stable in every period t =
T + ¿, ¿ = 1;2;::: if
hS
H (E0(!j! > ^ !0);E0(!j! < ^ !0);l) > 1;
where hS
H(:) is a function hS
H : R3
+ 7! R that decreases in E0(!j! > ^ !0),
and increases both in E0(!j! < ^ !0) and in l.
(ii) There exists T < 1 such that markets are stable in every period t =
T + 2¿ ¡ 1 and markets are unstable in every other period t = T + 2¿,
¿ = 1;2;::: if
hU
H (E0(!j! > ^ !0);E0(!j! < ^ !0);l) < 1;
where hU
H(:) is a function hU
H : R3
+ 7! R that decreases in E0(!j! > ^ !0),
and increases both in E0(!j! < ^ !0) and in l.
(iii) If !0 > µH=r, markets are stable every period if for all t = ¿, ¿ = 1;2;:::
hH (E0(!j! > ^ !0);E0(!j! < ^ !0);l;t) < 1;
10An increase in inequality corresponds to a decrease in E0(!j! < ^ !0) keeping constant
E0(!).
19and a two-period limit cycle emerges if for all t = 2¿, ¿ = 1;2;:::
hH (E0(!j! > ^ !0);E0(!j! < ^ !0);l;t) ¸ 1;
where hU
H(:) is a function hU
H : R3
+ £ N 7! R that for each t decreases in
E0(!j! > ^ !0), and increases both in E0(!j! < ^ !0) and in l.
Proof: In Appendix.
This means that also in case of (asymptotic) scarcity of land sustainability
of spot markets depends on the initial distribution of food. A more unequal
initial food distribution makes a limit cycle more likely, again a property that
is inherited from the static equilibrium. For l < s slackness of both necessary
and su±cient conditions for sustainable markets increases in l. Part (iii) of
the Proposition gives a necessary and su±cient condition for sustainability of
markets in form of a sequence depending on t.
5.3 Land and Inequality
Let us summarize the impact of changes in parameters on sustainability of
markets.
Corollary 1 If period 0 initial endowments are both su±ciently great and
su±ciently equally distributed, markets are sustainable. If land is abundant,
that is l > s, sustainable markets become more likely as land becomes scarcer.
If land is scarce, that is l < s, sustainable markets become more likely as land
becomes more abundant.
That is, comparative statics from the static equilibrium go through with re-
spect to endowment inequality for the dynamic case as well. Moreover, in our
framework, agents on the short market side gain positive rents and support
markets. A smaller mismatch on the market increases their measure and thus
facilitates sustainable markets.
5.4 Persistent Elites
The presence of a limit cycle in an economy may be compatible with either
persistent elites or social mobility. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Elites are persistent, i.e. for all i;j 2 I !i;t > ^ !t > !j;t
implies !i;t+2 > ^ !t+2 > !j;t+2 for all t > T, T su±ciently great, if there is a
20limit cycle where markets and expropriation alternate for all t and either (i)
l < s, or (ii) l > s and µH < µL=2.
Proof: Note ¯rst that in a period t when markets are not stable, !i;t > ^ !t > !j;t
implies !i;t+1 > ^ !t+1 > !j;t+1 for all i;j 2 I, that is there is almost no social
mobility by de¯nition. In t + 1 under spot markets
!i;t+2 ¸ br(!i;t+1 + pt+1) and
!j;t+2 · br(!j;t+1 ¡ pt+1) + bµH:
Taking the minimum (maximum) with respect to ! over both classes of agents
yields a su±cient condition to have !i;t+2 > ^ !t+2 > !j;t+2 for all i;j de¯ned
as above.11
br(^ !t+1 + pt+1) > br(^ !t+1 ¡ pt+1) + bµH;
that is 2pt+1 > µH=r. If rpt+1 = µH this always holds, and in case rpt+1 = µL
it holds whenever µH < µL=2. Using Lemma 3 the proposition follows. ¤
Proposition 8 states that social mobility is precluded when the market
allocates the surplus to the landholders, that is when land is scarce. To have
social mobility both return on skills must be su±ciently high and skill must be
scarce relative to land, so that surplus goes to the skilled on the market. Note
that this ¯nding has the °avor of a resource curse when land is interpreted as
natural resources.
Intuitively, elites are persistent when buyers of land cannot accumulate
su±cient food for their o®spring to overtake sellers' o®spring. To see this,
suppose that in period t expropriation occurs. In t + 1 the jungle is replaced
by spot markets. Sellers of previously expropriated land may earn enough to
preserve their rank in the food distribution at the end of period t + 1. This
is the case if sellers get the surplus on the spot market or the productivity
di®erence between skilled and unskilled agents is su±ciently small.
5.5 Long Run Growth Rates
Growth rates in an economy with the possibility of expropriation are linked to
stability of markets. The assumption br > 1 guarantees that the growth rate
11Since skill is drawn independently the condition is also necessary if there exist neighbor-
hoods ! 2 (^ !¡²; ^ !t+1) and ! 2 (^ !; ^ !t+1+²) both endowed with positive measure according
to Ft+1, that is if mini2I:¸i;t+1=1 = ^ !t+1 and maxi2I:¸i;t+1=0 = ^ !t+1.
21will be positive and converge to br as t goes out of bounds, since aggregate
land endowment remains constant. Since markets allocate land to its most
productive use, wealth accumulation can be expected to be faster in economies
with stable markets. Denote food holdings in an economy by !S
t when markets
are sustainable and by !U
t if there is a limit cycle.
Corollary 2 Economies with stable markets accumulate wealth faster than do
economies where markets are unstable, that is Et+¿(!S) > Et+¿(!U) for all
¿ > 1 if Et(!S) ¸ Et(!U).
This statement follows directly from minfs;lgµH +maxfl¡s;0gµL > l(sµH +
(1¡s)µL). The next result gives growth rates depending on long run stability
of markets. If there is a two-period limit cycle periods of very low growth under
expropriation are followed by periods of high growth when markets take place
and the previous e±ciency losses are partially recovered.
Proposition 9 (Growth Rates)
(i) In an economy with sustainable markets the growth rate in period t is




























for periods t0 when markets are stable.
Proof: In Appendix.
In an economy where markets are unstable and there is a limit cycle there
is room for non-monotonic behavior of the growth rate: in periods with stable
markets the growth rate will exceed the one of the previous period when
markets were not stable. This is veri¯ed in the following proposition.
22Proposition 10 (Fluctuations of the growth rate) Suppose an economy
possesses a two-period limit cycle and minfs;lgµH+maxfl¡s;0gµL > brl(sµH+






Proof: Note that gU
t < gU
t+1 holds if br is su±ciently close to 1 since
Et+1(!) = brEt(!) + blsµH + bl(1 ¡ s)µL:
Using the facts that !t > p and E(!t) is strictly increasing in t, it must hold
that if minfs;lgµH + maxfl ¡ s;0gµL > brl(sµH + (1 ¡ s)µL there exists ¿
su±ciently great such that gU
t < gU















Figure 3: Growth rates depending on stability of spot markets
An example for possible growth paths of two economies that have equal
initial period aggregate food endowments but di®er in the distribution is de-
picted in Figure 3.12
12To generate the ¯gure parameters were chosen such that s > l and sµH > brl(sµH +(1¡
s)µL.
236 Case Study
To illustrate our point further we look at the postwar development of three
Asian countries, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines.13 In the beginning
of the 1960ies all three countries looked reasonably similar in terms of key
socio-economic indicators such as per capita GDP, school enrollment, life ex-
pectancy, share of urban population. Our observations start shortly after the
Korean war, suggesting that Korea was at a disadvantage. The economic
growth paths experienced by these countries look, however, remarkable di®er-
ent. Korea's annual growth rate averaged 5.9 % p.a. in the period 1960-2004,
Malaysia's 4.6 % p.a. and the Philippines' 1.5 % p.a.
A brief glance at the development of political institutions does not reveal
striking di®erences either. All three countries emerged as sovereign nations
only after the Second World War, Korea and Philippines from Japanese oc-
cupation and Malaysia from British colonial rule. Each country had its share
of authoritative government, the Philippines under the Marcos, Malaysia un-
der the Mahathir, and Korea during the Rhee and Park administrations. In
all countries the government assumed an active role and pursued economic
policies aimed at promoting industrialization.
A di®erence did exist in the level of economic inequality in the three coun-
tries in the beginning of the 1960ies. Whereas Korea was a remarkably equal
country after a land reform in the late 1940ies that created a large class of small
landholders, both Malaysia and the Philippines were characterized by high in-
come inequality (as measured by Gini coe±cient and quantile ratios). More-
over, Korea had no ethnic fractionalization to speak of unlike both Malaysia
and the Philippines.
Indeed a case can be made that economic institutions in the three coun-
tries evolved strikingly di®erent. Economic interaction in the Philippines was
subject to high corruption, threat of expropriation by the government, and
occasional social and religious unrest and con°ict for most of the period of
observation. In Malaysia positive discrimination in education towards ethnic
Malays distorted education choice. As a consequence of the crisis in 1969 pos-
itive discrimination was extended, business ownership for non-ethnic Malays
was severely restricted and large public companies had to provide Malays with
well-paid jobs. In contrast economic activity in Korea took place under secure
13The interested reader may not that our choice of countries mirrors the one of B¶ enabou
(1996) adding Malaysia.
24property rights. Distortions by the government were mainly due to loan and
export subsidization.
Figure 4: Di®erence to Korea's average annual per capita growth rate
That is, whereas in Korea markets appear to have been mostly stable in
our terminology, markets in Malaysia seemed to operate under a constraint
on the distribution of rents, and markets in the Philippines were subject to
expropriation in form of corruption and kleptocracy and con°ict. Comparing
the growth rates of Malaysia and the Philippines with Korea's reveals a cyclical
behavior as depicted in Figure 4 and predicted by the model.14
7 Summary and Conclusion
We presented a very simple framework where economic outcomes are deter-
mined by robustness to coalitional deviations of agents. This restriction serves
to capture quality of economic institutions on an abstract level as a condition
directly on the primitives of the model. We argue that our choice of modeling
approach is instructive since despite its simplicity a rich set of outcomes is pos-
sible. A subset of the model's results, such as persistent elites, have already
been generated in less abstract frameworks thus indicating that the present
approach to embed quality of economic institutions connects well with the ex-
isting literature. Moreover, we ¯nd that static stability of market allocations
14The cyclical behavior in Figure 4 is not limited to the particular choice of period length.
Similar patterns appear with di®erent choices of interval lengths.
25is favored by more equal endowment distributions and higher correlation of
rent and endowment. Long run stability of market allocations becomes more
likely both as initial period endowment inequality and the mismatch between
market demand and supply decreases.
Of course, the present approach willingly gives up complexity to achieve
mathematical tractability. Yet, given the results, a number of directions come
to mind that future research may successfully pursue. One natural extension
extends the set of feasible contracts to include spot, debt, future and con-
tingent contracts and thus allows for the development of a state of anarchy
into full Arrow-Debreu markets. This yields a number of potentially interest-
ing strategic considerations. For instance, stability of debt contracts will be
driven by a trade-o® in the present period between an increase in demand due
to relaxing budget constraints and higher incentives to expropriate due to the
existence of a spot market next period.
A second extension that looks fruitful consists in enriching the model by
allowing for ethnic groups such that collective action is less costly among
agents of the same ethnicity may yield another set of testable predictions
linking market outcomes to the degree of ethnic fractionalization.
Another valuable endeavor lies in considering stability of markets within a
full-blown endogenous growth model. By introducing an investment decision
both its relationship between market stability may be explored and the mis-
match between demand and supply on the market becomes endogenous. The
latter enables the possibility that only market allocations supporting certain
distributions of surplus may be sustainable.
Finally, note that removing endogenous growth (by setting br < 1) easily
allows for a poverty trap that arises from the interaction of credit market
frictions and stability of market outcomes. We conjecture that poverty traps
found in such a model need not coincide with traditional individual poverty
traps.
26A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Net demand for land D(pt) on a spot market in some period t depends on the
market price pt and is given by
D(pt)=
8
> > > > > > <






Supply of land S(pt) is given analogously by
S(pt)=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if 0 · rpt < µL
[0;¹(i : ¸i;t = 1;µi;t = µL)] if rpt = µL
¹(i : ¸i;t = 1;µi;t = µL) if µL < rpt < µH
[¹(i : ¸i;t = 1;µi;t = µL);¹(i : ¸i;t = 1)] if rpt = µH
¹(i : ¸i;t = 1) if rpt > µH
Equalizing supply and demand yields the expression in the proposition. The
second part is immediate from (1) and 0 · Ft(:j¸i;t=0) · 1 ¡ l. ¤
Proof of Lemma 1
Note that v(µi;!M
i ;¸M
i ) < v(µi;¸0
i;!i;t) if ¸0





i = 0 and ¸i;t = 1, or if ¸0
i = 0 and ¸i;t = 0 but rpt < µi and
pt < !i;t, or if ¸0
i = 1 and ¸i;t = 1 but rpt > µi. De¯ne accordingly
C = fi 2 I : ¸0
i < ¸i;t = 1g [ fi 2 I : ¸0
i = ¸i;t = 0 ^ rpt < µi ^ pt < !i;tg
[fi 2 I : ¸0
i = ¸i;t = 1 ^ rpt > µig;
C0 = fi 2 I : ¸0 > ¸i;tg:






















27Agent i's marginal contribution to the objective function ¢(i) of receiving
land ¸0
i = 1 (as opposed to ¸0
i = 0) is
¢(i) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if i 2 C for ¸0
i = 0;¸0
i = 1
0 if i 2 C0 for ¸0
i = 0;¸0
i = 1
!i;t if i 2 C for ¸0 = 0;i = 2 C0;i = 2 C for ¸0
i = 1
!i;t if i = 2 C;i = 2 C0 for ¸0 = 0;i 2 C0 for ¸0
i = 1
2!i;t if i 2 C for ¸0 = 0;i 2 C0 for ¸0
i = 1
All other cases can be excluded. Since the constraint binds with equality for
the optimal coalitional expropriation ¸0
i = 1 if ¢(i) > e !, with e ! : ¹(i 2 I :
¢(i) ¸ e !) = l ^ e ! = 0. Conditioning on the market price pt the statement in
the lemma follows. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3
Stability with respect to expropriation follows immediately from the assump-
tion in the proposition since it implies that the RHS of (3), (4), and (5) are
all zero, while the LHS are non-negative. Turn now to stability of the market
allocation with respect to optimal coalitional redistribution when rpt = µH,








This condition must hold with strict inequality since e ! has the property that
¹(i 2 I : e ! < !i;t < ^ !t;(µi;t;¸i;t) 6= (µL;1)) · ¹(i 2 I : !i;t > ^ !t;(µi;t;¸i;t) =
(µL;1)) and !i;t ¸ !j;t for all i with (µi;t;¸i;t) = (µL;1) and j with (µj;t;¸j;t) 6=
(µL;1) with strict inequality for some i;j with positive measure whenever
!t 6= w0.










Again, since e ! is optimally chosen such that ¹(i 2 I : e !=2 · !i;t · e !;(µi;t;¸i;t) =
(µH;0)) = l ¡ ¹(i 2 I : ^ !t · !i;t · e !;(µi;t;¸i;t) 6= (µH;0)), the above con-
dition holds, as !i;t ¸ !j;t for all i with (µi;t;¸i;t) 6= (µH;0) and j with
(µj;t;¸j;t) 6= (µH;0) with strict inequality for some i;j with positive measure
whenever !t 6= w0. A similar argument applies to the case µL < rpt < µH.
For the last statement note that ^ !t · µL=r implies that rpt = µL and land is
28obtained on the market only by agents i with !i;t ¸ ^ !t. Since these agents
already hold land the market allocation is the endowment allocation which
coincides with the allocation under expropriation. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4
In case rpt = µH markets are stable if
Z ^ !t
!t







!idFt(!i;¸i = 1) ¡
Z !t
e !
!idFt(!i;¸i = 0) ¸ 0:
Redistributing ¢ units of foods by uniformly taking from agents i 2 fi 2 I :
!i > ^ !t and uniformly giving to agents in i 2 fi 2 I : !i < e !g yields the





1 + (1 ¡ l)(1 ¡ s)
l(1 ¡ l)
¹(i 2 I : !i > ^ !t ^ ¸i = 1)
¸
¢:
This expression is positive if s is su±ciently close to 1 or the correlation
between events ¸i = 1 and !i > ^ !t su±ciently low.














An adequate redistribution is given by taking ¢ units of food uniformly from
agents i 2 fi 2 I : !i > e !g and giving uniformly to agents i 2 fi 2 I : !i < e !g.
The change in the LHS of the above condition is given by
¹(i 2 I : !i;t < e !;¸i = 1) ¡ s¹(i 2 I : !0 < !i;t < e !;¸i = 0)
1 ¡ ¹(i 2 I : !i;t > e !)
¢
+
¹(i 2 I : !i;t > e !;¸i = 0)
¹(i 2 I : !i;t > e !)
¢
This expression is nonnegative since ¹(i 2 I : !i;t < e !;¸i = 1) ¡ s¹(i 2 I :
!0 < !i;t < e !;¸i = 0) = ¹(i 2 I : !i;t > e !) ¡ ¹(i 2 I : !i;t > 0;¸i = 1) by
de¯nition of e !;!0. In case µL < rpt < µH both arguments from above can be
exploited. ¤
29Proof of Proposition 5
Let (¸¤;!¤) denote a static equilibrium allocation. It is to show that there





i ) for all i 2 I with at least one strict inequality. By Proposition 2
(¸¤;!¤) is either induced by a market or by expropriation.
Suppose ¯rst (¸¤;!¤) is a spot market allocation. Hence, v(µi;¸¤
i;!¤
i ) ¸
v(µi;¸i;t;!i;t) for all i 2 I. For any coalitional expropriation (¸0;!t) it must
hold that either v(µi;¸i;t;!i;t) = v(µi;¸0;!i;t) for all i 2 I or v(µi;¸i;t;!i;t) >
v(µi;¸0;!i;t) for some i 2 I. This implies that equilibrium allocations implied
by markets are constrained Pareto e±cient.
Suppose now (¸¤;!¤) is an allocation under expropriation. Consider an al-




i ) for all i 2 I. In case (¸¤;!¤) 6= (¸M;!M)
it holds that v(µi;¸¤
i;!i;t) > v(µi;¸M
i ;!M
i ) for i 2 I with ¸¤
i = 1, ¸i;t = 0
given a strictly positive market price. Suppose there does not exist i 2 I with
¸¤
i = 1 and ¸i;t = 0. Then ¸¤ = ¸t, that is ¸i;t = 1 if !i;t ¸ ^ !t and ¸i;t = 1
if !i;t ¸ ^ !t. But this implies that either ¸¤ = ¸0 or, if not, by Proposition 3
that (¸M;!M) is stable with respect to all other feasible allocations and thus
that (¸¤;!¤) is not an equilibrium allocation, a contradiction. Consider now
an allocation (¸0;!0) 6= (¸¤;!¤) implied by coalitional expropriation. Then
v(µi;¸¤
i;!i;t) > v(µi;¸0
i;!i;t) for i 2 I with ¸¤
i = 1, ¸0
i = 0. Hence, equilibrium
allocations implied by expropriation are constrained Pareto e±cient. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2
Note ¯rst that rpt = µH is equivalent to
¹t(µi;t = µL;¸i;t = 1) · ¹t(µi;t = µH;¸i;t = 0;!i;t ¸ µH=r):
Because of independence of µ and ¸ this is equivalent to
(1 ¡ s)l · s¹t(¸i;t = 0;!i;t ¸ µH=r):




























30since br > 1 and therefore !i;t+1 = br!i;t + bµH > µH=r if ¸i;t = 1. Because
(1 ¡ s)l does not vary in time it su±ces to show that
¹t+1(i : ¸i;t+1 = 0;!i;t+1 ¸ µH=r) ¸ ¹t(¸i;t = 0;!i;t ¸ µH=r):
Using (15) we obtain
(1¡qH

















Using the expression for qH
t from (13) shows that this condition holds true.
Therefore rpt = µH implies rpt+1 = µH. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof proceeds in steps. First we determine a su±cient condition for
stability of markets in any period t + 1 given stable markets in t for t;t + 1
such that !t > µL=r. By Lemma 3 we know that there exists T < 1 such that
this is the case for all t > T. Then we transform this su±cient condition into a
condition on initial period 0 endowments using an appropriate approximation
of the growth path in periods 0;:::;t. Finally, we repeat this exercise with a
su±cient condition for unstable markets in period t + 1 given stable markets
in period t. Using the transition functions (9) and (11), and the uniform








































































(i) Suppose markets were stable in period t. This is without loss of generality
since otherwise by Proposition 3 markets will be stable in t + 1 allowing to
simply relabel periods. Markets are stable with respect to expropriation if











Since markets were stable in period t with rpt = µL and land was rationed
among the unskilled,
Et+1 (!j¸=0) = brEt(!) + lbµL: (18)
Turn now to the RHS of (17). Note that if markets were unstable in t ¡ 1,
Ft+1 (^ !t+1;¸=0) ¸ (1 ¡ l)2 = (1 ¡ l)(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ qL);
since Ft(^ !t;¸=0) = Ft¡1(^ !t¡1) = 1 ¡ l in this case. If markets were stable in
t ¡ 1 on the other hand, by the de¯nition of ^ ! and (16)




































Since Ft+1 (^ !) = 1 ¡ l we know that





























as all these agents have income r!i + ¸iµL and do not bequeath land with




!dFt+1(!j¸=0) ¸ (1 ¡ l)2brEt(!j! < ^ !t): (19)
Plugging (18) and (19) into (17) yields a su±cient condition for stability of




< (1 + (1 ¡ l)s)Et(!j! < ^ !t):
Independently of whether spot markets are stable or not in any period t,
Et(!) · brEt¡1(!) + b(sµH + (l ¡ s)µL) and Et(!j! · ^ !t) ¸ brEt¡1(!j! <




Et(!j! < ^ !t)
<
E0(!) + b(sµH + (l ¡ s)µL)
(br)t¡1
(br¡1)(br)t + l µL
r(br)t
E0(!j! < ^ !0)
<
E0(!) + b(sµH + (l ¡ s)µL) 1
br¡1 + lµL
r
E0(!j! < ^ !0)
:
The su±cient condition follows
E0(!) + b(sµH + (l ¡ s)µL) 1
br¡1 + lµL
r
E0(!j! < ^ !0)
< 1 + (1 ¡ l)s:
De¯ne hS





E0(!j!<^ !0) ¡ (1 ¡ l)s.
Taking the derivatives of hS
L(:) yields part (i) of the proposition.
(ii) Now turn to a su±cient condition for expropriation in period t+1. Suppose
again that markets are stable in some period t. This is again without loss of
generality. Stability of markets in period t implies
Et+1(!j! < ^ !t+1) · brEt(!j! < ^ !t) + b(sµH + (1 ¡ s)µL):
Note that aggregate wealth of all poor agents must exceed aggregate wealth
of poor agents without land:
Z ^ !t+1
!t+1
!dFt+1 (!;¸=0) · (1 ¡ l)Et+1(!j! < ^ !t+1):
Using these expressions and (18) on (17) a necessary condition for stability of
markets in t = 1 is
brEt(!) + lbµL > (1+s)(brEt(!j! < ^ !t) + b(sµH + (1¡s)µL)):
Note that Et(!) ¸ brEt¡1(!) + blµL and Et(!j! < ^ !t) · brEt¡1(!j! <

















E0(!j! < ^ !0) + b(sµH + (1 ¡ s)µL) 1
br¡1
:
33Hence, a necessary condition is given by
E0(!) + lµL
r
E0(!j! < ^ !0) + b(sµH + (1 ¡ s)µL) 1
br¡1
> 1 + s:
De¯ne hU







the derivatives of hU
L(:) then establishes the proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 7
The proof of this proposition is analogous to the proof of Proposition 6. Choose
t such that !t ¸ µH=r. This is possible for t < 1 by Lemma 3. Using
the transition functions (12) and (14), and the uniform rationing among the
































(i) Suppose markets are stable in period t without loss of generality. Using











This expression is, since land is distributed independently among skilled agents



















Et+1(!j! > ^ !t+1): (21)
Note that, independently of whether markets are stable in any period t or
not, Et+1(!j! < ^ !t+1) ¸ brEt(!j! < ^ !t). Et+1(!j! > ^ !t+1) · brEt(!j! >
^ !t)+bµH. Since, regardless of stability of markets or expropriation, not more
34than a fraction s of the rich in period t may obtain µH twice in two consecutive
periods, for any period t > 2 it must hold that
Et(!j! > ^ !t) · (br)2Et¡2(!j! > ^ !t¡2) + bµH + b2r(sµH + (1 ¡ s)µL):
Therefore
Et+1(!j! > ^ !t+1) · (br)t+1E0(!j! > ^ !0) + b(µH + brE[µ] + (br)2µH + :::);
with E[µ] = sµH +(1¡s)µL. That is, a lower bound on the ratio of conditional
expectations is given by
Et+1(!j! < ^ !t+1)
Et+1(!j! > ^ !t+1)
¸
(br)
t+1 E0(!j! < ^ !0)
(br)
t+1 E0(!j! > ^ !0) + b(µH + brE[µ] + (br)2µH + :::)
¸
E0(!j! < ^ !0)




Hence, a su±cient condition for stable markets independent of t is given by
E0(!j! < ^ !0)
















Taking the derivatives of hS
H(:) establishes part (i) of the proposition.
(ii) Turn now to a su±cient condition for stability of expropriation in t + 1.
Since for all t Et+1(!j! < ^ !t+1) · brEt(!j! < ^ !t) + bµH and Et+1(!j! >
^ !t+1) ¸ brEt(!j! > ^ !t), an upper bound on the ratio of conditional expecta-
tions can be obtained as follows.
Et+1(!j! < ^ !t+1)
Et+1(!j! > ^ !t+1)
·
(br)




t+1 E0(!j! > ^ !0)
·
E0(!j! < ^ !0) + bµH
1
br¡1
E0(!j! > ^ !0)
:
Then a su±cient condition for unstable markets in periods t + 1 following a
period with stable markets is given by
E0(!j! < ^ !0) + bµH
1
br¡1













ing the derivatives of hS
H(:) establishes part (ii) of the proposition.
35(iii) Suppose !0 > µH=r. A su±cient condition for a two-period limit cycle
starting in period 0 is for any period t = 2¿, ¿ = 1;2;:::
(br)
t+1 E0(!j! < ^ !0)
(br)





This is su±cient, since if markets are not stable in periods t + 1 and t ¡ 1,
t > 0, this implies
Et+1(!j! < ^ !t+1) = brEt(!j! < ^ !t) = (br)2Et¡1(!j! < ^ !t¡1) and
Et+1(!j! > ^ !t+1) = brEt(!j! > ^ !t) + bµH
= (br)2Et¡1(!j! > ^ !t¡1) + bµH + b2r(sµH + (1 ¡ s)µL):
Therefore conditional expectations can be calculated:
Et+1(!j! > ^ !t+1) = (br)t+1E0(!j! > ^ !0) + b(µH + brE[µ] + (br)2µH + :::);
Using the set of conditions (24) we can de¯ne a time dependent function








If hH(:;t) > 1 for all t > 0 then stable markets are sustainable and if
hH(:;t) · 1 for all t = 2¿, ¿ = 1;2;::: a two-period limit cycle emerges.
Taking the derivatives of hH completes the proof of the proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 9
For part (i) suppose the economy reaches sustainable markets, that is for each
t ¸ T such that !T > p=r markets are stable. Then aggregate income in
period t is given by rEt(!) + minfs;lgµH + maxfl ¡ s;0gµL. Since agents
bequeath at a constant rate b,
Et+1(!) = brEt(!) + bminfs;lgµH + bmaxfl ¡ s;0gµL:
This means that the growth rate of aggregate wealth in an economy with
sustainable spot markets gS









It easy to see that gS
t is strictly positive and therefore also decreasing in time
t.
36To show part (ii) suppose now that markets are not sustainable and there
is two period cycle for t ¸ T. Let markets be unstable in periods with even
t and be stable in every other. When t is even and markets are not stable
aggregate income in period t is given by rEt(!)+lsµH +l(1¡s)µL. Thus the
growth rate of aggregate wealth for even periods t, gU









In odd periods t + 1, when markets are stable, aggregate income is given
by rEt+1(!) + minfs;lgµH + maxfl ¡ s;0gµL. This gives the growth rate of










Both growth rates are positive and decreasing in t. ¤
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